Statement by

Mr. Heidar Ali Balouji

First Counselor

Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations

on “Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy”

at the Main Committee III of the Tenth NPT Review Conference

New York, 8 August 2022

In the Name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful.

Madam Chairperson,

At the outset, I would like to congratulate you on your election as the Chair of this Committee and assure you of the full cooperation of my delegation. My delegation associates itself with the statement made by Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement.

The peaceful use of nuclear energy plays a significant role in the scientific, technological, and socio-economic advancement of developing countries. Nuclear knowledge-sharing and technology transfer to interested developing countries, as envisaged in the NPT and the IAEA Statute, are critical in this context.

We do believe that, according to article IV of the NPT, promoting the full realization of the inherent rights of States Parties to develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is a key component and one of the fundamental objectives of the NPT.

In line with this Article, the Final Documents of 1985, 2000, and 2010 NPT Review Conferences have confirmed and reiterated that each country’s choices and decisions in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be respected and protected. It is noteworthy that as reaffirmed by the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, this right of States “includes an inalienable right to develop, for peaceful purposes, a full national nuclear fuel cycle” (see NPT/CONF.2020/WP.25, para. 8). Any proposal to limit or restrict this inalienable right of States parties would be in contravention of article IV of the Treaty.

The Treaty, in its article IV, also provides for an undertaking by all the parties to the Treaty to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the right of all parties to the Treaty to participate in such exchange. Full compliance with this legal obligation by all States parties, in particular those possessing advanced nuclear technology, equipment, and scientific information, is essential.

It is important to add that the effective and successful operation of the IAEA technical assistance and cooperation program is critical to the performance of its task of promoting nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. It is necessary to take practical steps to ensure that IAEA resources in this area are sufficient, assured, and predictable.

Therefore, all States in a position to do so, especially the developed states, should support and assist in strengthening this role of the IAEA. Also, the policy of funding technical cooperation based on voluntary contributions must be changed, because such contributions are unpredictable, unsecured, and subject to the political motivations of the donors. Safeguards’ activities are, however, being funded from the regular budget. Such a discriminatory policy concerning two pillars of the IAEA statute and the Treaty must be abandoned. The Review Conference needs to review the status of implementation of the above-mentioned actions and, if necessary, provide guidance.

Implementation of measures to achieve the objective of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons shall in no way affect the inalienable right of States Parties to the NPT to develop research, production, and use of nuclear energy, including the sovereign right to develop a full national nuclear fuel cycle, for peaceful purposes, without discrimination and in conformity with their obligations under their comprehensive safeguards’ agreement with the IAEA.

 As stipulated in the Treaty, and duly noted in the Review Conferences, particularly in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference (NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and II) the safeguards required under article III shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with Article IV of the Treaty and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear materials and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes.

On another note, it is also necessary to highlight that the U.S. decisions to impose unilateral and illegal sanctions against civilian nuclear cooperation projects with Iran constitute a clear violation of the U.S. obligation under Article IV of the NPT.

In addition, it is a matter of deep concern that certain States Parties continue to impose unilateral and arbitrary restrictions beyond the IAEA safeguards on the transfer of nuclear materials, equipment, and technology for peaceful purposes.

Regrettably, such restrictions are applied to NPT States Parties where non-parties to the Treaty with nuclear weapons arsenal benefit from nuclear cooperation by certain nuclear-weapon States.

Madam Chair,

Attacks or threats of attack on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful uses endanger nuclear safety, violate the purposes and principles of the United Nations as well as the rights of States parties to develop and use of nuclear energy and constitute a serious threat to the entire IAEA safeguards regime. Such threats have intensified in recent years and the Security Council and the IAEA have failed to take appropriate actions.

Lastly and given the above-mentioned considerations, to reflect in the outcome document, we have elaborated a series of concrete proposals in our related working paper, and additionally in the full version of this statement which has been shared with the secretaire.

The Tenth Review Conference should include in its final document the following elements:

1. Reiterating the full respect for the inalienable rights of all States parties under article IV of the Treaty, which includes the right to develop nuclear technology and to have full access to nuclear materials, technology and equipment for peaceful purposes;
2. expressing profound concern about attacks or threats to attack on nuclear facilities, strongly condemning such attacks and threats and declaring that they constitute a serious threat to the IAEA safeguards regime and are viewed by States parties as prohibited.   
3. Committing to ensure the full and non-discriminatory implementation of obligations under article IV of the Treaty;
4. Stressing that no State party should be limited in exercising its rights under the Treaty based on allegations of non-compliance;
5. Stressing the need to refrain from pursuing any explicit or implicit proposal or action, by any State or organization, that intends to hamper, directly or indirectly, the nuclear policies of States parties to develop a full national nuclear fuel cycle for peaceful purposes;
6. Underscoring that the Treaty does not prohibit in any way the use or transfer of nuclear technology, materials, or equipment to States parties for peaceful purposes based on sensitivity;
7. Committing to terminate any restrictions or limitations on the transfer of nuclear materials, equipment, or technology to States parties that have an IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreement in force;
8. Calling upon States parties participating in export control regimes to swiftly remove any restrictions on the transfer of nuclear materials, equipment, and technology for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy to requesting States parties;
9. Acknowledging that the efforts to promote non-proliferation should not impair the legitimate rights of States parties, especially the developing countries, to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy;
10. Stressing that export control should not lead to the establishment of a discriminatory and selective regime that would impose restrictions on the transfer of nuclear materials, equipment, and technology to developing States parties;
11. Underlining that the developed States parties and IAEA should enhance assistance to the developing States parties in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy;
12. Reaffirming that any explicit or implicit decision or action that intends to hamper the nuclear policies of States parties to develop a full national nuclear fuel cycle shall be avoided;
13. Committing to the enforcement, without exception or further delay, of the total and complete prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material, facilities, resources, and devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to non-parties to the Treaty.

I thank you, Mr. Chair.