Statement by
H.E. Mr. Asadollah Eshragh Jahromi
Director General for International Peace and Security
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran
on “Nuclear Non-Proliferation”
at the Main Committee II of the Tenth NPT Review Conference
New York, 8 August 2022
In the Name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful.
Madam. Chair,
At the outset, I would like to congratulate you on your election to the Chairmanship of this Committee and assure you of the full cooperation of my delegation. My delegation associates itself with the statement made by Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement.
Madam. Chair,
The best way to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects and to enable the NPT to continue its contribution to international peace and security is the full and effective implementation of the Treaty’s articles I to VI and universal adherence to the NPT. As long as nuclear weapons exist, the risk of their proliferation both vertically and horizontally will persist.
Articles I and II of the NPT establish the central non-proliferation obligations of the State parties. NATO’s nuclear-weapon-sharing agreements breach these obligations as they allow the transfer of hundreds of U.S. nuclear weapons to certain European non-nuclear-weapon States. Under such agreements, the control of such weapons could be ceded to recipients to use them under certain conditions. The United States by transferring nuclear weapons and a few European parties including Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands by receiving and harboring such weapons in their territory are in clear breach of their non-proliferation obligations under articles I and II of the Treaty. We call on States participating in nuclear weapon sharing to return to full compliance with their nonproliferation obligations by terminating such unlawful arrangements.
The proliferation risks of the intended transfer of weapon-grade high enriched uranium and relevant technology to handle and process such material to Australia by the U.S. and UK under the trilateral security partnership known as AUKUS should not be ignored. The US and UK must respect their obligation under Article I of the NPT and refrain from providing any assistance to Australia in acquiring nuclear weapons. Double standards in nuclear non-proliferation have to be abandoned.
Madam. Chair,
The Islamic Republic of Iran remains steadfast in fulfilling its obligation under Article II of the Treaty as well as in supporting international efforts in pursuance of the universality of the NPT in the Middle East. We express our concern about the continuation of actions and policies by certain nuclear-weapon States that precludes the achievement of the universality of the Treaty in the Middle East. In a clear example of the application of double standards, the United States continues to assist and protect the illicit and clandestine nuclear weapons program of the Israeli regime, both materially and diplomatically, in violation of its international commitment. The conference should call upon the Israeli regime to renounce possession of nuclear weapons and eliminate its entire stockpile of nuclear weapons. The conference should also call upon all State parties for the prohibition of nuclear cooperation with, and the transfer of all nuclear facilities, resources, or devices to, the Israeli regime.
With regard to article III, it is essential that the IAEA conducts its verification activities under safeguards agreements in an impartial, independent and non-discriminatory manner in order to maintain the credibility of the Agency. We are concerned about the increased reliance by the IAEA secretariat on information provided to it by the western intelligence agencies. This would not serve the interests of the IAEA and would undermine its impartiality and independence.
Since the Agency is the only organization that receives highly confidential and sensitive information on the nuclear facilities of member States, it is necessary that the IAEA secretariat make every effort to respect and reinforce the principle of confidentiality regarding all information related to the implementation of safeguards in member States. The IAEA secretariat should distinguish legal obligations from voluntary confidence-building measures and that such voluntary undertakings shall not be considered as legal safeguards obligations.
Madam. Chair,
The original Small Quantities Protocols represent a weakness in the safeguards system that has to be addressed. The conference should urge State parties with the Small Quantities Protocol to rescind or amend them without delay. We encourage Saudi Arabia which is rapidly expanding its nuclear program and constructing nuclear facilities to rescind its outdated Small Quantities Protocol, implement fully its obligation under Article III of the NPT and allow the IAEA to conduct inspection and verification activities in nuclear facilities in Saudi Arabia in accordance with the comprehensive safeguards agreement.
Non-proliferation measures should be consistent with the inalienable rights of the State parties on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and their obligation to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of nuclear equipment and materials for peaceful purposes. The conference should call for the elimination of unilateral coercive measures and arbitrary export controls which constrain the effective implementation of article IV of the Treaty. It should also call on States parties to refrain from imposing or maintaining any restrictions or limitations on the transfer of nuclear equipment, materials, and technology to State parties with comprehensive safeguards agreements.
Thank you, Madam Chair.