Statement by

Mr. Heidar Ali Balouji

First Counselor

Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations

At the First Substantive Session of

the Open-Ended Working Group on Conventional Ammunition

On Agenda item 5(e) Comprehensive framework to support safe, secure and sustainable through-life ammunition management

at the national, subregional, regional and global levels

New York, 27 May 2022

In the Name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful.

Mr. Chair, 

I am delighted to see you presiding over the OEWG in excellent health, and we thank H. E. Ambassador Maritsa Chan for offering to chair the Group, which enabled the first substantive session to take place on time. 

Mr. Chair, 

In addition to what we said in our statement during the general exchange of views, I'd like to share with you and other colleagues a few observations we have about the OEWG's past, present, and future.

In fact, we have noted the submission of the GGE report, as well as adoption of the Resolution 76/233. Both have components that are acceptable to not only my delegation but also to many other delegations; yet, due to the exclusive character of the GGE and the adoption resolution by voting, these two documents contain some elements that will be difficult to establish consensus among all member states.

For example, recognizing the importance of appropriate national ammunition management structures and procedures, including laws and regulations, training and doctrine, equipment and maintenance, personnel management and finances, and infrastructure to ensure sustainability in ammunition management, and emphasizing in this regard the central role of the provision of technical assistance and capacity-building to member states, upon their request, is a positive element in the resolution.

In a similar vein, it appears that the GGE report attempted to define safety and security of ammunition management in paragraphs 20 and 21. However, in paragraph 29(d), the report acknowledges that the definition of ammunition differs considerably across various frameworks. Given the divergent perspectives of member states on the scope of the topic under consideration by the OEWG, it is critical to establish a clear and agreed definition in this respect. 

Although the consequences of poor ammunition stockpile management, particularly in terms of human life and the environment, are devastating, it is yet too early to relate it to international peace and security.

We, like numerous other delegations, want to stress the establishment of national systems for marking and tracing ammunition, as well as mechanisms for gathering data, of course as aggregate and not disaggregated. 

The primary and original concern in this respect was ammunition in surplus; however, the issue has been enlarged to include the life of ammunition in both the GGE report and the resolution. Moreover, a few requests to cover conventional armaments as the subject of the OEWG have been made in deliberations so far, with varying degrees of emphasis, indicating that some delegations believe that only small and light weapons should be discussed, while others believe that larger caliber armaments should be included as well. We are aware of the fact that each stage of the life cycle of conventional ammunition and weapons has its own features and requirements, so taking a blanket solution to all of them might exacerbate the problem rather than solve it. As a result, we recommend sticking to the initial mandate on the problems arising from the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus.

Given the varying environmental contexts of conventional ammunition stockpiles and the numerous processes that apply in this respect, adopting a consistent global framework for all countries does not appear acceptable or realistic. Furthermore, we believe that developing such a global framework with solely voluntary political commitments should be consensual, independent, and without prejudice to national ammunition management requirements. As a result, we believe that the most significant role they can play in the future is to provide recommendations on maximizing ammunition safety and security management without expanding member states' responsibilities at the national, regional, and international levels. Reporting, verification, and regional collaboration are examples that are not supported by all.

However, in order to demonstrate the efficacy of the recommendations that will be made, it may be appropriate to consider first, countries with a greater need of improving ammunition safety and security management.

The rationale for extending regional and country-specific techniques to a global level should be appropriately developed in this regard. Any decision to globalize those recommendations can be adopted after a review of the results of the accomplishments. 

Therefore, I should state right away that seeking to impose any obligation on a specific category of ammunition, supporting or justifying any parallel export control, embargo, or unilateral coercive measures beyond the globally accepted documents, and simply relying on open-source data will not lead to a consensual outcome, and thus will not be acceptable to my delegation.

Many delegations have acknowledged that some of the difficulties that countries may face during ammunition stockpiling, management, and disposal are a lack of trained specialists, the need for proper funding, upgraded infrastructure, supply equipment, and storage conditions that are safe and secure. As a result, it is recommended that capacity building and the materialization of international cooperation be given top priority in a timely and innovative way. Legislative and regulatory assistance will not guarantee enforcement. As a result, we place a high value on supplementary means of implementation, such as financial support and the transfer of necessary equipment, technology, and software to developing nations. Other proposals for addressing the safety and security issues stemming from inappropriate ammunition stockpile management include: Establishing a specialized fellowship program; Establishing a specific trust fund; Convening workshops; Technical support; and Institutional technology transfer.

To sum up Mr. Chair, it is our earnest hope that this process will finish well for all parties involved and that we will participate constructively in the discussions and development of the final document of the OEWG.

 I thank you.