Statement by

Mr. Heidar Ali Balouji

First Counselor of the Permanent Mission

of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations

On Preamble and the Scope of General Obligations and Prohibitions

Before the Second Session of the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction

New York, 30 November 2021

In the Name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful.

Mr. President,

This is an unprecedented moment wherein a treaty covering all types of weapons of mass destruction is to be discussed, negotiated, and codified., Furthermore, the complexity of the situation further increases when taking into consideration the applicable region for this treaty.

Before elaborating on my delegation’s specific viewpoints, I would like to highlight that we assume these deliberations as a suitable way to exchange views on all issues under discussion at this early stage of the process. We will finalize our position together with the evolvement of discussions as well as the regional developments thereof. 

Similar to any other international treaty, this treaty should also start with a preamble enumerating the contracting parties involved in its conclusion. Although a preamble should not generally give rise to any particular rights or obligations under international law, it should define the purposes and considerations in general terms that led the parties to conclude the treaty.

In this case, the main reasons behind this cause include the humanitarian consequences of all weapons of mass destruction and their risk of use as well as the need to prevent such horrors from reoccurring again. In this context, the use or threat of use of any WMD, by any party, and under any circumstances must be rejected. 

The preamble could also establish a distinct connection with relevant international instruments, such as the NPT, BWC, CWC, and CTBT, wherein their acceptance is and will be an essential condition to implement the future treaty on the Middle East.

It could further demonstrate and elaborate the side effects of the treaty by declining any conditionality in either membership or implementation of its provisions. A logical and natural expectation from this treaty will be enhanced global and regional peace and security through disarmament as well as non-proliferation. 

It must also indicate that full regional membership, on one hand, and universal recognition and respect, especially by the NWSs, on the other should be envisaged in such a treaty. Last but not least, in this section, international cooperation on peaceful uses as an integral part of the treaty should be promoted. 

In terms of objectives typically covered by a treaty, our treaty can set complete and total prohibitions on the full cycle of armament as its main objective. Therefore, this should include a comprehensive prohibition and, in brief, should stipulate the statute of a total absence of WMDs in the region while guaranteeing compliance with obligations derived from that statute. This should cover all places under the jurisdiction of the regional parties in the designated region. Thus, not only it will focus on the land but also the aerial and sea borders of the respective parties. 

Following the scope of the treaty which we believe should cover weapons of mass destruction, namely, nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, some general and main obligations will shape the core and overarching principles of the treaty. It is obvious that these obligations start with the main prohibitions that, as mentioned, must cover all activities with regard to the WMDs.

We are aware of the fact that the current relevant international instruments tackle a variety of activities. It is especially notable that some of the existing similar treaties have overlooked a comprehensive prohibition. However, we strongly believe that our treaty should never have such shortcomings. Therefore, these prohibitions must include development, production, stockpiling and use or threat of use of all WMDs. Given the raison d'etre of the treaty, it is obvious that most of these prohibitions imply and include a number of other aspects. For example, prohibition of development shall apply to research activities as well. In the same vein, prohibition of production addresses and encompasses testing. Furthermore, transit, transfer, receipt, deployment and stationing activities all fall under the prohibition of stockpiling.

These prohibitions must be applicable inside the designated territories and under the jurisdiction of the regional parties through the implementation of the treaty that will have mechanisms of verification and control to enforce its obligations. In this regard, it is also recognized as such by the General Assembly of the United Nations.

The general obligations can also be listed in detail, and it will be comprised as follows:

• Not to research, develop, manufacture, stockpile, acquire, possess or have any control over any NBC weapon or other nuclear explosive device;
• Not to seek or receive assistance in any of the above; 
• Not to assist in or encourage such actions; 
• The transit, receipt, storage, stockpiling, installation or another form of possession of any nuclear weapon or nuclear explosive device on the territory of the member states are not allowed; 
• Each party pledges not to carry out NBC weapon tests or any other nuclear explosion and prevent any such explosion at any place under its control;
• Within a specific timeline, the participating states should agree to conclude with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)and enforce the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement before the treaty’s entry into force. A special decision should be taken on the Additional Protocol; 
• A similar approach with the OPCW and the BWC implementing unit should be considered and applied;
• The participating states must also introduce and undertake the avoidance of providing a source or any special fissionable material or related equipment to any non-nuclear-weapon state (NNWS) that has not concluded an IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreement and Additional Protocol;
• Further, the states agree to maintain physical protection of nuclear material, facilities and equipment that are at least as effective as outlined in the IAEA recommendations and guidelines by the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPNNM); 
• The treaty does not affect the rights and obligations of the parties under other international treaties concluded prior to the entry into force of the treaty;
• The treaty may be amended by consensus; and
• A Protocol which is open for signature by the United States, China, France, Russia and the United Kingdom.

In closing, given the importance of the task and the necessity of a complicated but delicate balance, we believe that prior to drafting any articles regarding this section, a number of expert meetings are required to clarify all possible questions with ample time and answers. 

I thank you, Mr. President.