



In the Name of God, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful

No. 2612923

28 August 2025

Excellency,

I have the honour to transmit herewith, in the attachment, a letter dated 27 August 2025 from His Excellency Dr. Seyed Abbas Araghchi, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, addressed to Your Excellency, concerning the assertions in the letter dated 8 August 2025 by Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (the E3) with regard to the situation surrounding the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2231 (2015).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its attachment circulated as a document of the Security Council and the General Assembly under the agenda item 84 “the rule of law at the national and international level”.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.


Amir Saeid Iravani
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

H.E. Mr. Antonio Guterres
Secretary-General
United Nations, New York

H.E. Mr. Eloy Alfaro de Alba
President of the Security Council
United Nations, New York

Cc:
H.E. Mr. Philemon Yang
President of General Assembly
United Nations, New York



MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN

In the Name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

27 August 2025

Excellency,

I have the honour to address certain false assertions contained in the letter dated 8 August 2025 of the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (hereinafter the E3), concerning the situation surrounding the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2231 (2015). The letter, by misrepresenting facts, constitutes yet another attempt to lay groundwork for two courses of action that both are unjustified and set dangerous precedents in undermining credibility and integrity of the UNSC and its Resolutions.

E3's misrepresentation of facts

I must reiterate that this conduct cannot be justified by reference to the fully legitimate and legal remedial measures of the Islamic Republic of Iran that were implemented, in a gradual and proportionate manner, and in full conformity with the relevant procedures and rights provided under the JCPOA. Ironically, however, the E3's letter inadvertently reveals two fundamental flaws in their argument for a possible attempt to invoke the so-called snapback:

A) Sequence matters. By falsely alleging that “*Iran activated the Dispute Resolution Mechanism only in July 2020*”, the E3 seek to delegitimize Iran's remedial measures, misrepresenting the sequence of events, while concealing the fact that the Islamic Republic of Iran had formally activated the DRM in a letter on 10 May 2018. That notice led to meetings of Joint Commission and other steps foreseen for exhaustion of the Mechanism. Again, on 21 August 2018 Iran reaffirmed invocation of the Paragraph 36, saying that it had earlier “invoked the dispute resolution mechanism under paragraph 36 of the JCPOA to which end the Joint Commission convened at the level of political directors and Ministers of Foreign Affairs on 25 May and 6 July 2018 respectively”.

By raising the issue of the sequence, the E3 implicitly acknowledge that the order of DRM activation by different sides matters; and that the measures taken pursuant to Paragraph 36 of the JCPOA cannot justify reciprocal countermeasures by other parties. In short, the E3's own reasoning admits that remedial measures cannot be invoked to against the other side's prior remedial measures, and that such invocation is inadmissible and inapplicable.

B) False claim that DRM activation needs recognition. Falsely asserting that “*any other purported recourse to this mechanism was never recognized by the JCPOA's participants, neither at the time, nor today,*” the E3 suggest that validity of the DRM activation needs a consensus among Participants. By this very logic, the E3's own attempt to activate the DRM or snapback lacks validity, since it has not been explicitly recognized by other participants.

If there is one DRM activation that was fully recognized and exhausted, it is the one triggered by the Islamic Republic of Iran on 10 May 2018. This was followed by an extraordinary Joint Commission meeting on 25 May 2018 and a Ministerial level meeting on 6 July 2018, both convened at Iran's request. Following these meetings, Iran stated in several communications -including in letters dated 21 August 2018, 6 November 2018, and 7 April 2019- that it had invoked paragraph 36 of the JCPOA and that, should the significant non-performance of the other parties persist, it will exercise its rights and “gradually and based on a planned timetable [will] cease performing its commitments under the JCPOA.”

In fact, the E3's letter is self-defeating. The E3's attempt to activate DRM, which was followed by further non-performance on their behalf, amounted to an act of “remedy against remedy” which was neither recognized by all Participants nor fully exhausted.

As comprehensively detailed in the letter dated 29 January 2020 of the then Iranian Foreign Minister to the Coordinator of the JCPOA (attached herewith), the Islamic Republic of Iran had effectively and formally activated and exhausted the DRM, long before initiating its remedial measures, and only after it became evident that the issues arising from the US withdrawal and imposition of sanctions against Iran cannot be redressed by other Participants.

It must be emphasized that the E3's invocation to the JCPOA Dispute Resolution Mechanism by referring to their letter dated 14 January 2020 in response to Iran's remedial measures of May 2019 onward, is totally misleading and irrelevant. As expressed in many communications, Iran's decision to cease performing its commitments was a lawful and legitimate response, according to its rights under paragraphs 26 and 36 of the JCPOA, to the U.S.'s unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA and the re-imposition of its unlawful sanctions. Therefore, it is absolutely illogical for E3 to describe their intention not to implement their commitments or trigger snapback as a reaction to Iran's lawful remedial

measures taken one long year after U.S. unlawful withdrawal and the E3/EU's failure to implement their own obligations.

The Islamic Republic of Iran has expressly and formally communicated, on several occasions, to the Coordinator of JCPOA Joint Commission – and through him/her to other participants- that it triggered DRM under paragraph 36 of the JCPOA. In its letter dated 29 January 2020, in particular, Iran indicated that it had exhausted all recourses foreseen in Paragraph 36. The ministerial level Joint Commission meeting of 6 July 2018 recognized issues referred by Iran to the Joint Commission as “unresolved issues” and accordingly adopted a series of commitments in that regard. Those issues still remain "unresolved" today and no outcome has been agreed to the satisfaction of Iran as the complaining participant. The issues that are yet to be resolved to the satisfaction of Iran cannot constitute a basis for E3's decision to trigger snapback mechanism.

It should be noted that these facts in no way affect the exclusive rights of Iran under Paragraph 26 of the JCPOA, which explicitly states that Iran “will treat such a re-introduction or re-imposition of the sanctions... as grounds to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part.”

Unlike the E3’s bad-faith conduct, Iran’s measures, taken in full conformity with its rights under Paragraphs 26 and 36, were intended to preserve the deal by compelling compliance, not to undermine it. Iran provided ample notice, engaged in good faith through multiple Joint Commission meetings, calibrated its actions to allow for reversibility, and maintained diplomatic engagement aimed at restoring full implementation of the JCPOA by all parties. The E3’s portrayal of these lawful measures as “non-performance” ignores their own culpability in provoking this legitimate recourse.

Resolution 2231 must end on Termination Day

In line with its policy of using snapback as a leverage to extract concessions from others, the E3 has “offered” a limited extension of the “relevant provisions of the UNSC 2231”, providing that Iran fulfills certain demands; however, the Islamic Republic of Iran strongly believes that the Resolution 2231 must expire according to the timeline foreseen therein.

Any other attempt would contravene realities, disregard the resolution’s purpose, set a bad precedent in the function of the Security council and deepen divisions within the Council. Needless to say, in such an unfortunate scenario, Iran will decisively and proportionately react, considering its supreme national interests.

Iran urges the Security Council to adhere strictly to the binding timelines enshrined in Resolution 2231, allowing its provisions to lapse as intended and paving the way for

renewed diplomatic engagement in a more constructive atmosphere, free from coercion and threats.

Iran remains open to diplomacy


Iran firmly believes that diplomacy remains the most effective and potent avenue for resolving differences. As stressed during the meeting of Iran's Deputy Foreign Ministers with EU/E3 Political Directors on 25 July in Istanbul, the Islamic Republic of Iran remains committed to meaningful diplomatic engagement aimed at achieving a new agreement – one that respects Iran's rights under the NPT while addressing all mutual concerns, including the unjust sanctions that have targeted the well-being and prosperity of the Iranian people.

We urge all Members to reject the unjustified political manipulations and to uphold the integrity of international law and authority of the Council. The path forward lies in mutual respect, not coercion.

I would be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Seyed Abbas Araghchi

 **Minister of Foreign Affairs**

- H.E. Mr. Antonio Guterres, Secretary General of the United Nations
- H.E. Mr. Eloy Alfaro de Alba, President of the United Nations Security Council
- H.E. Madam Kaja Kallas, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Coordinator of the JCPOA Joint Commission
- Honorable members of the United Nations Security Council

Attachment) Letter dated 29 January 2020 to the Coordinator of the JCPOA

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

His Excellency

Mr. Josep Borrell

**High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
Coordinator of the JCPOA Joint Commission**

Excellency,

I am writing to express our grave concern regarding your letter of 14 January 2020, attaching letter of the foreign ministers of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, purporting the “*Activation of the JCPOA Dispute Resolution Mechanism*”. The recent move expressly reveals the E3’s dramatic shift on the intent and the underlying objectives of the JCPOA. In this vein, the letter is in blatant contravention of the provisions of JCPOA and is disparaging to the will of the international community as expressed in UNSC Resolution 2231. In response to the unfounded claims in the E3’s letter, I would like to raise the following issue for consideration and appropriate rectification by the remaining JCPOA Participants, including the Coordinator, as well as for immediate action by the Coordinator to correct the discriminatory approach- as elaborated in item IV below-in notification of correspondence from JCPOA Participants.

I. Exhaustion of DRM by the Islamic Republic of Iran

With respect to the genuine unresolved issues, namely the significant non-performance as the result of continuous unlawful conduct of the United States and ongoing failures of the E3/EU -fully elaborated in my pervious communications- the Islamic Republic of Iran has expressly and formally, on several occasions, communicated to the Coordinator of JCPOA Joint Commission -and through her to all other JCPOA participants- that it had triggered DRM under paragraph 36 of the JCPOA.¹

The unresolved issues are: 1) the unlawful US withdrawal and re-imposition of sanctions; 2) the significant non-performance by E3/EU in fulfilling their commitments under the JCPOA; and 3) the utter failure to implement commitments adopted unanimously by the Joint Commission at ministerial level on 6 July 2018 and 24 September 2018—each

¹Paragraph 36 of the JCPOA: “*If Iran believed that any or all of the E3/EU+3 were not meeting their commitments under this JCPOA, Iran could refer the issue to the Joint Commission for resolution*”

following meetings at the level of Deputy Foreign Minister/Political Director as foreseen by Paragraph 36, and convened “Upon the request of the Islamic Republic of Iran” to “review unresolved issues arising from the unilateral withdrawal of the United States from the agreement and the announced re-imposition of sanctions lifted under the JCPOA and its Annex II”, which confirmed that “the lifting of sanctions, including the economic dividends arising from it, constitutes an essential part of the JCPOA.”

Following the unlawful withdrawal of the United States and the re-imposition of its nuclear related sanctions already lifted in accordance with the JCPOA, Iran, while reserving its immediate right under paragraph 26², officially triggered paragraph 36 of JCPOA in its letter of 10 May 2018, leading to the holding of Joint Commission meetings at official and ministerial levels. As clarified in detail in my letter of 21 August 2018, Iran clearly invoked the DRM under paragraph 36 of the JCPOA, in response to which the Joint Commission—as prescribed by paragraph 36 of the JCPOA—convened at the level of political directors and Ministers of Foreign Affairs on 25 May³ and 6 July 2018 respectively⁴.

On 6 July 2018, at the ministerial Level, the JCPOA Joint Commission recognized that “*the lifting of sanctions, including the economic dividends arising from it, constitutes an essential part of the JCPOA*”. In fact, that was self-evident as reflected in paragraph 26 of the JCPOA. Unilateral withdrawal of one Participant and re-imposition of sanctions lifted under the JCPOA had such dramatic negative effects that it even prevented other participants from fulfilling their commitments, and has substantially endangered the stability and integrity of the entire agreement. For this reason, *the Joint Commission met to review “unresolved issues arising from the unilateral withdrawal of the United States from the agreement and the announced re-imposition of sanctions lifted under the JCPOA and its Annex II.”*

Fully recognizing the fact that the US withdrawal and the re-imposition of its sanctions would greatly affect the full implementation of the JCPOA, the remaining Participants made 11 complementary commitments to redress the unlawful withdrawal of the US, without which the continuation of full implementation by Iran would have been irrelevant. Regrettably, none of the commitments made by the E3/EU have been

²Paragraph 26 of the JCPOA: “Iran has stated that it will treat such a re-introduction or re-imposition of the sanctions specified in Annex II, or such an imposition of new nuclear-related sanctions, as grounds to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part.”

³The Chair’s statement following the meeting states that meeting was held “upon the request of the Islamic republic of Iran in order to review the implications of the withdrawals of the United States from the JCPOA.”

⁴The Joint Statement states that “the Joint Commission met to discuss the way forward to ensure the continued implementation of the nuclear deal in all aspects and review unresolved issues arising from the unilateral withdrawal of the United States from the agreement.”

implemented or have resulted in practical solutions. As specified in my letter dated 7 April 2019, the E3/EU did not take any meaningful practical measure in performance of their own JCPOA obligations as well as their repeated commitments following the U.S. unilateral and unlawful withdrawal from the JCPOA.

Furthermore, there have been multiple significant performance issues related to the E3/EU that are inconsistent with the letter, spirit and intent of the JCPOA, as well as the Joint Commission statements adopted following the US withdrawal. I have duly registered these significant non-performance issues in several letters to the Coordinator of JCPOA Joint Commission and elaborated them in my letter of 17 July 2019.

The E3—or the Joint Commission—never questioned the unresolved issues which have been raised by Iran through different letters, let alone objected to the invoking of paragraph 36, or contested Iran’s open assertions about the US’ and E3’s significant non-performance. Late submitted challenges by the E3 cannot change the facts, and would certainly not deprive Iran from exercising its rights under paragraphs 26 and 36.

Due to the fact that the issues arising from the withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA and the re-imposition of its sanctions—as well as E3 failures to implement their commitments under the JCPOA and the statements of 15 May 2018, 25 May 2018, 6 July 2018, 24 September 2018 and 6 March 2019—have remained unresolved, Iran decided to exercise its right under paragraph 36 of the JCPOA to cease its commitments in part beginning from 8 May 2019.

ii. Inadmissibility of Invoking of Paragraph 36 of the JCPOA by E3

After one year of Iran's restraint with good faith following the US withdrawal, and following exhaustion of all recourses foreseen in Paragraph 36 by Iran, any attempt by the E3 to initiate the DRM—without regard to settlement of the unresolved issues raised by Iran—is inconsistent with “good faith” that underpins any international agreement and has been explicitly underlined in many paragraphs of the JCPOA. This view is shared by the Russian Federation Foreign Minister in his letter of 15 January 2020.

Therefore, any DRM initiation disregarding these facts and without preliminary settlement of issues arising from the multiple cases of already-substantiated—and even admitted—significant non-performance by the US and E3 of their obligations under the JCPOA as well E3/EU’s abject failure to fulfil their commitments after the unlawful US withdrawal—hence failing to create conditions ensuring “essential” economic benefits for Iran from the lifting of the EU sanctions—is without any base and thus inadmissible.

Through different formal letters to the Coordinator of the JCPOA Joint Commission, Iran has exhausted the DRM under Paragraph 36. Following the re-imposition with full

effect of all lifted sanctions by the United States on 5 November 2018, Iran—in its letter of 6 November 2018 to the Coordinator of JCPOA Joint Commission under Paragraph 36—clearly stated that it had “initiated the Dispute Resolution Mechanism under paragraph 36 of the JCPOA on 10 May 2018. But, acting in good faith, we refrained from applying the ‘remedy’ and did not immediately resort to ‘cease performing its commitments under the JCPOA’, in order to enable the remaining JCPOA Participants to make good on their above-mentioned promises.” The letter provided a full chronology of events following the unlawful U.S. withdrawal and the multiple cases of significant non-performance of E3/EU’s own obligations under the JCPOA, Iran clearly articulated that it had exhausted the procedures under paragraph 36 and had no option but to resort to the remedies provided under said paragraph. In another good-faith effort to preserve the JCPOA, Iran requested the convening of *another* ministerial meeting of the Joint Commission, which was never convened.

In another manifestation of good faith, Iran only started to cease performing its commitments in part on 8 May 2019—over six months after the letter of 6 November 2018— while informing the Coordinator of the Joint Commission that “Following several meetings of the JCPOA Joint Commission, the overwhelming majority of the cases of ‘significant non-performance’ remained unresolved, as solid ‘grounds to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part’ by Iran’.” Iran received no formal response even at this stage.

The first official reaction from the E3 came on 21 June 2019 in form of a publicized demarche. Within 4 days, in a letter dated 25 June 2019, Iran provided a fully-documented rebuttal to “ccusations, misinterpretations, misrepresentations, threats and ultimatums that manifest a lack of good faith and mutual respect, and constitute multiple grave breaches of the letter, spirit and intent of the JCPOA” and elaborated in detail how Iran had triggered the DRM.⁵

Therefore, the E3 are not in a legal or moral position to trigger the DRM in response to Iran’s restrained application of the lawful remedy explicitly recognized in the same paragraph of JCPOA. The E3 cannot pursue the same legal course of action vis-à-vis Iran. This is against the object of the DRM in the JCPOA and of a general principle of law among civilized nations.

Considering the above-mentioned facts and bearing in mind that the E3 request is not aimed at promoting the goals and purposes of the JCPOA and UNSC Resolution 2231,

⁵Iran triggered the DRM through as expressed in my letters: 10 May 2018, 21 August 2018, 6 November 2018, and 7 April 2019. For better clarification, see the attached Diagram (How Iran Exhausted the Procedure of Dispute Resolution Mechanism) which I tweeted on 10 July 2019 (<https://twitter.com/JZarif/status/1148917515256500225>) .

resorting to the DRM and any pointless follow-up attempts are groundless in fact or law, unjust and unlawful, and shall be strongly rejected.

iii. Irresponsible Statements of E3 Officials

On 23 September 2019, in a televised interview that would only embolden the U.S. president in his long-held aggressive stance on the JCPOA, the prime minister of the United Kingdom portrayed the JCPOA as a “*bad deal*” and went so far as to ask for a “*better deal*” to be made by the “*one guy who can do a better deal.*”⁶

Two days later and on 25 September 2019, the UK foreign secretary in an Oral Statement to Parliament stated, “*as both President Trump and President Macron have said, we can improve upon the JCPOA. Ultimately, we need a longer-term framework that provides greater certainty over Iran’s nuclear programme.*”⁷

The E3 assertion in the Heads of States’ Joint Statement of 12 January 2020 that “we will also need to define a long-term framework for Iran’s nuclear programme”⁸ represents a grave breach of the JCPOA and Security Council Resolution 2231, in a clear manifestation of “bad faith” questioning of the already negotiated time-lines firmly established without any qualification in the JCPOA and Security Council Resolution 2231.

On 14 January 2020 the UK prime minister in a televised interview went a step further and publicly aligned and associated his country with the party killing the JCPOA: “Let’s replace it with the Trump deal, President Trump is a great dealmaker. Let’s work together to replace the JCPOA and get the ‘Trump deal’ instead.”⁹

Such statements are in grave contravention of Paragraph 28 of the JCPOA¹ and a telling sign of a European reversal of attitudes towards the landmark accord and illustrate the apparent total E3 submission to the whims of this U.S. administration.

⁶British Prime Minister, Boris Johnson’s interview with “NBC Nightly News”, 23 September 2019. Available at: <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/boris-johnson-calls-new-iran-nuclear-deal-says-trump-one-n1057541>

⁷ UK Foreign Secretary, Oral Statement to the Parliament, 25 September 2019. Available at: <https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2019-09-25/debates/95159D35-0C2F-4137-9553-5711477D8CBE/Iran>

⁸Statement from the heads of state and government of France, Germany and the United Kingdom: 12 January 2020. Available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/e3-statement-on-the-jcpoa-12-january-2020>

⁹ British Prime Minister, Boris Johnson’s interview with “BBC News”, 14 January 2020. Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-51104386>

¹Paragraph 28 of the JCPOA: “*The E3/EU+3 and Iran commit to implement this JCPOA in good faith and in a constructive atmosphere, based on mutual respect, and to refrain from any action inconsistent with the letter, spirit and intent of this JCPOA that would undermine its successful implementation. Senior*

In its totality, the E3 recent statements and actions do contribute to the unlawful and unilateral policy of “*Maximum Pressure*” against Iran. The United States Special Representative for Iran, Brian Hook, stated on 17 January 2020 that “*We were pleased to see the United Kingdom, France, and Germany initiate the Iran nuclear deal dispute resolution mechanism earlier this week. Prime Minister Johnson called to replace the Iran nuclear deal with a new deal, which we very much support.*”¹

Finalization of the JCPOA on 14 July 2015 was a momentous step to resolve, through negotiations and based on mutual respect, a manufactured and unnecessary crisis. The JCPOA is the final solution and there is no alternative for it, and any statements against this fact are inconsistent with good faith in the implementation of the JCPOA.

As mentioned in my later dated 3 October 2019, the JCPOA, as manifest in its name, is a “*comprehensive*” plan of action negotiated and concluded as a final solution for the entirely artificial crisis fomented over Iran's peaceful nuclear program. The exact and clear durations in the JCPOA are additional evidence to that account. The participants in the JCPOA—unanimously endorsed as an inseparable part of UNSCR 2231—have made it clear that after the time frames envisaged in the accord, the Iranian nuclear program will be treated in the same manner as that of any other non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT. The E3 have conveniently—and indeed arrogantly—disregarded the hard bargaining—from the very first day of informal bilateral and multilateral negotiations to the very last day of announcing the conclusion of JCPOA on 14 July 2015—and many important and substantive irreversible flexibilities that were shown by Iran until the very last day in order to nail these dates. With all due respect, this is nothing less than the old colonialist mantra of “*what’s mine is mine and what’s yours is negotiable*”. The Islamic Republic of Iran strongly rejects this approach, and furthermore, will never accept it.

We strongly urge the E3 to reverse this approach embedded in the Statement and their contradictory propositions vis-à-vis the JCPOA. Furthermore, we request that the Joint Commission of the JCPOA address and take appropriate measures to resolve these issues in a satisfactory manner within the next meeting of the Joint Commission.

iv. Discriminatory Approach with respect to Iran’s Communications

Government officials of the E3/EU+3 and Iran will make every effort to support the successful implementation of this JCPOA including in their public statements”

¹Brian H. Hook, Special Representative for Iran, Special Briefing, 17 January 2020. Available at: <https://www.state.gov/special-representative-for-iran-brian-hook/>

The letter and statement dated 14 January 2020 of the distinguished Coordinator of the Joint Commission—acknowledging the purported activation of the Dispute Resolution Mechanism by the E3—are unacceptable, and discriminatory vis-à-vis correspondences by the Islamic Republic of Iran invoking- in good faith and with full global acceptance, unlike that of E3- the DRM under paragraph 36 of the JCPOA.

The unfortunate discriminatory approach of the EU High Representative, as the Coordinator of the Joint Commission, has no legal and/or procedural effect on the level of validity and legitimacy of the process. Rather, this would only challenge the impartiality of the coordinator, which in turn would lead to further undermining of the efforts to preserve the JCPOA.

More specifically, we object to the reference to the purported "triggering the Dispute Resolution Mechanism" in the statement dated 24 January 2020 issued following intense and extensive bilateral and informal collective consultations, in which Iran participated with utmost good faith and constructiveness. I would like to reaffirm that these references do not, and cannot, change the facts. Indeed, they amount to utter disrespect for Iran, hence torpedoing the stated 'overarching goal' of maintaining the JCPOA in this highly sensitive situation surrounding the deal.

With respect to the statement dated 24 January 2020 following the informal consultations on 22 January 2020¹, I would like to put on the record that nothing from that statement shall mean that the Islamic Republic of Iran has accepted or acquiesced to the admissibility of the request by the E3 and as fully elaborated above, Iran continues to believe that their request is against the object and purpose of the JCPOA.

The Islamic Republic of Iran strongly rejects this approach, regards it devoid of any procedural and substantial impact, and expects this issue to be duly addressed and rectified without further delay. At the very least, the Islamic Republic of Iran expects the distinguished Coordinator to acknowledge - both in a letter as well as a similar public statement - that Iran triggered - and exhausted in good faith - the Dispute Resolution Mechanism as of 10 May 2018.

Excellency,

In order to manifest our good faith and serious desire to protect the JCPOA, even at this fifth and last phase of partial cessation of implementation of our voluntary commitments, I wish to underline once again that all measures taken can be reversible, and the Islamic Republic of Iran will continue its full and effective cooperation with IAEA.

The Islamic Republic of Iran remains prepared to continue dialogue at all levels, and to resume full implementation, commensurate with the implementation of the commitments by the remaining participants of the JCPOA particularly by E3/EU who have specific obligations under the JCPOA as well as obligations undertaken by all remaining JCPOA participants following Joint Commission Ministerial Meetings of 6 July and 24 September

https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/73436/statement-high-representative-josep-borrell-following-consultations-jcpoa-participants_en

2018, convened upon the request of the Islamic Republic of Iran within the Dispute Resolution Mechanism under paragraph 36 of JCPOA.

I would be grateful if you, in your capacity as Coordinator of the Joint Commission of the JCPOA, would circulate this letter with the remaining participants of the JCPOA.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Javad Zarif
Minister of Foreign Affairs

How Iran Exhausted the Procedure of Dispute Resolution Mechanism (As Set out in Paragraph 36 of the JCPOA)

