



Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations

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In the name of God, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful

No. 2235936


10 October 2024

Excellency,

Upon instructions from my Government, and with reference to Note No. 2208576 dated 21 September 2024, regarding the observations and reservations of the Islamic Republic of Iran on the Pact for the Future and its annexes, namely the Global Digital Compact and the Declaration on Future Generations, I have the honour to present the **Explanation of the Position of the Islamic Republic of Iran on the Pact for the Future** and its annexes dated 7 October 2024 (attached herewith).

I would be grateful if this letter would be placed as an official document of the 79th session of the General Assembly, under its related agenda item.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.


Amir Saeid Iravani
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

H.E. Mr. Philemon Yang
President of the General Assembly
United Nations, New York

Reservations and Explanation of the Position of the Islamic Republic of Iran on Pact for the Future and its annexes

In the Name of Allah, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful

The Islamic Republic of Iran actively and constructively participated in the consultations and negotiations of the Summit of the Future, recognizing it as a crucial platform to address the world's urgent challenges and needs, with a focus on strengthening the United Nations, multilateralism, global cooperation, and solidarity. However, the presented Pact falls short of these ambitious objectives and does not achieve the necessary benchmarks to protect our world and lead it toward prosperity, well-being, sustainable development, and peace.

Therefore, we do not consider the Pact to be a negotiated and consensus-based text. Regrettably, our legitimate concerns and inputs have been ignored throughout the process. Hence, Iran submitted its Explanation of Position on September 21, 2024, prior to the adoption of the text. I would like to highlight our position once again in this plenary as follows:

1. The Pact for the Future does not reflect the reality of challenges of our world. It could benefit more from a balanced perspective. The Pact fails to adequately address the root causes of violations of international law and the Charter of the United Nations. In this context, it is regrettable that the Pact has fallen short of upholding tangible measures and mechanisms to respect the rights and sovereignty of developing countries with the aim "to protect succeeding generations from the scourge of war."

2. It is also regrettable and disheartening that, despite the fact that genocide was occurring right in front of our eyes, this document ignores this problem and fails to address our immediate and basic threats, including nuclear weapons, foreign occupation, and particularly the genocide occurring in Gaza and now ongoing war crimes and atrocities are being committed against the people of Lebanon, while diverting attention from these important issues to other made-up ones.

3. Similarly, the Pact and its annexes have overlooked the negative impact of the imposition of unilateral coercive measures (UCMs), external economic sanctions, and other restrictive measures that are against sovereign equality of States, international law, fundamental principles of Human Rights as well as international cooperation and solidarity. The Pact lacks effective provisions, actions and mechanisms to explore and eliminate these obstacles, including their extraterritorial impacts, which severely affect the full achievement of economic and social development, and realization of human rights, including the right to life, health and development, particularly in developing countries. The Islamic Republic of Iran renews its call for addressing, removing, and refraining from the promulgation of the UCMs as a separate, urgent and cross-sectoral objective, including during the implementation stage of the Pact and its annexes.

4. We emphasize the pivotal role of national sovereignty and the right of each country to determine its own development path. Iran considers the outcome documents of the Summit as non-legally binding, voluntary instruments, presenting non-mandatory and non-obligatory actions and recommendations. The Islamic Republic of Iran declares that it is not committed, at all, to those

parts and elements of the above-mentioned documents which are in one way or another in contradiction with the national priorities, laws, regulations, legislation and policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran as well as Islamic cultural and religious norms, ethical and moral values of the Iranian society. Moreover, in all domestic issues, national upper-handed instruments, plans, programs and strategies shall enjoy total priority and would be considered as the sole and final source of action and reference.

5. Therefore, it is challenging to endorse specific provisions in the Global Digital Compact which do not acknowledge the sovereign right of States to prioritize their programs and actions in line with their own national laws, interests, security, stability, and safety. Countries have jurisdiction and sovereignty over infrastructures, data, resources, services, and activities related to information and communication technologies in their territories. We dissociate ourselves from Paragraphs 11(c), 14, 17, 43, 44, 11(d), 23(a), 29(d), 31(d), 39(d) of the GDC).
6. The developed countries have yet to meet their environmental responsibilities and the principle of Common, but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR) has not been given significant consideration in the Pact and its annexes. Categorizing environmental issues under security-related subjects is not appropriate. Instead, the developed countries, particularly those responsible for significant climate change and pollution, should be requested to fulfill their obligations on financial support and technology transfer to developing countries without any condition. Transitioning away from fossil fuels as referred to in the Pact is a deviation from the language adopted by the COP-28. The Pact falls short to mention the voluntary nature and consideration of

national context and realities in the shift from fossil fuels. We cannot agree with this approach (Paragraph 28(c) of the Pact). In addition, we recall that the objective of the ongoing negotiation on combating plastic pollution is focused on addressing the plastic waste management and the issue of sound management of chemicals has no place in the mandate given by the UNEA resolution 5/14 of 2022 (Paragraph 29(d) of the Pact).

7. It is reiterated that the intergovernmental nature of the United Nations must be preserved in all circumstances. The purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations remain as valid and relevant today as they were when first established. In this vein, we express our reservation on any idea concerning the role and engagement of other stakeholders played at the expense of the role of governments or which undermines the intergovernmental nature of the United Nations System, its meetings, and activities. Regarding the multi-stakeholder vision of the Global Digital Compact, it is necessary to clarify and identify the accountability and responsibilities of big technology companies and cross-border social platforms before users, people, and regulatory bodies of the countries.
8. We also express our reservations on certain controversial and non-consensual terms, phrases and concepts in the Pact and its annexes. This includes, inter alia, preventive diplomacy, gender related terms, reproductive rights, , new and emerging forms of referencing to controversial concepts such as multiple and overlapping ways of discrimination as well as such terms, concepts and elements used at the outcome documents of review conferences and regional review conferences of the Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development and the Beijing Platform for

Action (paragraph 27(f) of the Pact). Moreover, we insist on using the term “the family” as the natural and fundamental group unit of society - instead of families. We also continue advocating for family-oriented policies and programs aimed at enhancing family well-being, strengthening community ties, and fostering a supportive environment for all family members, including children and youth leading to sustainable development.

(insert OHCHR)

9. Frequent references to human rights concepts and gender issues throughout the Pact and its annexes, not only is considered as an unbalanced approach to the well-established three pillars of the United Nations, but also undermines the technical nature of the subjects in different fields which are basically neutral when it comes to any classification based on sex, among others. It will deviate outcomes from genuine purposes. Considering gender issues, solely, as a prerequisite for development, while neglecting issues such as the removal of UCMs which are essential for achieving sustainable development, is not a constructive and inclusive approach (Paragraph 19 of the Pact). Similarly, we do not align with the actions in which the functions of science, technology, and innovation have been constrained to human rights and gender equality solely (Paragraphs 54, 55 of the Pact).

10. The Pact and the Global Digital Compact must aim at contributing to the sustainable development of all nations. Undertaking selective approaches toward strengthening specific United Nations mechanisms focused on one pillar of the Organization, including strengthening the role of office of the Human Rights Council and the office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, undermine the development orientation of the outcome documents.

The Global Digital Compact must maintain its technical nature and should uphold its mission to bridge the digital divide among developed and developing countries, rather than morphing into a purely human rights instrument for such purposes. Attributing a human rights framework to a technical subject will divert attention and resources away from developmental goals (this includes Paragraphs 24, 69, 73 of the GDC) which deem to become problematic. Similarly, the idea of strengthening or revitalization of the United Nations human rights mechanism and the Commission on the Status of Women, as proposed in the Pact, should only be advanced with the consensus of all member States as part of comprehensive and sufficient negotiations to reassure the necessity of such revitalization that does not conflict with the existing mandates of those platforms and will not contribute to the politicization of their objectives. Such initiatives should be planned and implemented to recognize and realize the right to development (Paragraphs 74, 71(d) of the Pact). We dissociate ourselves from paragraphs 22, 23 and 24 of the GDC and believe that such issues should be discussed within other relevant and established UN forums and mechanism.

11. On digital domain, we emphasize the importance of respecting cultural diversity and tailoring the digital domain and emerging technologies, particularly artificial intelligence, to local contexts, ensuring that they are used in a manner that is sensitive to the unique needs and values of different societies. Their benefits also should be shared equally at the global level and their risks and potential consequences minimized through meaningful international cooperation based on the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. We emphasize that any mechanism for governing or managing digital technologies and artificial intelligence, as well as data

governance, should respect the national sovereignty, rules and regulations and be advanced with the equal participation of all member States of the United Nations, especially developing countries and should assist these countries to reach their potentials and achieve their aspirations. Such provisions are lacking in the Global Digital Compact including in paragraphs 56, 57 of the GDC.

12. The Global Digital Compact falls short of reaffirming the foundational guidelines of the Tunis Agenda that have steered multilateral discussions on Internet governance for nearly two decades. These principles are crucial for preserving the integrity of the Internet and ensuring that the advantages of digital technologies are accessible to all nations equally. By not incorporating paragraphs 68 and 69 of the Tunis Agenda, the document fails to emphasize the importance of fostering inclusive and transparent Internet governance. All governments should have an equal role and responsibility for international Internet governance and ensuring the stability, security, and continuity of the Internet. We stress the need for Enhanced Cooperation, to fully involve all States, on an equal footing, in international Internet governance including the development of international public policy issues pertaining to the Internet (Paragraphs 27, 28, 29 of the GDC).

13. We express our serious concern at the continuous and progressive violation of international norms and obligations in the field of disarmament. To address this concern, full and effective implementation of existing nuclear disarmament obligations and commitments within a specified framework of time should be accelerated. Unfortunately, the Pact has fallen short of restoring the original balance of the NPT pillars in preserving and

strengthening the inalienable right of all Parties to the NPT to develop research, production, and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination. It also represents a step backward from existing obligations and commitments of Nuclear Weapon States concerning nuclear disarmament. The Pact should have called upon the nuclear-weapon States to engage in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiation leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control under Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It is regrettable that the Pact did not address this significant issue, and it is not included in the final document.

14. Moreover, the Pact needs to emphasize that States should do their utmost to implement immediately the resolution adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, concerning the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. The Action 25 of the Pact does not reflect this concern, so we cannot accept that action.

15. The Islamic Republic of Iran believes that the growth in the number of objects in outer space, such as mega constellations, the increasing role of the private sector, the return of humans to deep space, and our expanding reliance on outer space systems, demands that we urgently establish inclusive and equitable global governance in the relevant fora that is fit for developing countries.

16. Given that the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) is not referenced in the paragraph 47(c), my delegation is unable to consider itself bound by the commitments outlined in this paragraph (Paragraph 47(c) of the Pact).
17. Imposing restrictions on the legitimate use of conventional arms and military equipment is unacceptable. Furthermore, since the Islamic Republic of Iran is not a party to Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), we cannot accept obligations that align with this treaty (Paragraph 35(h) of the Pact for the Future).
18. There is no direct and immediate link between climate change and international peace and security. Focusing on climate change as a security issue could divert attention from more immediate threats such as nuclear weapons and foreign occupation. Also, addressing climate change through environmental and economic strategies, rather than framing it as a security concern, would be more effective in mitigating its impacts and fostering international cooperation.
19. Unfortunately, the Pact for the Future overlooks the crucial issue of international cooperation and assistance in new and emerging technologies. This includes capacity building, technical support, financial assistance, and technology transfer, to bridge the gap between developed and developing countries (Action 28).
20. While the Islamic Republic of Iran recalls the importance of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1981), it underlines that the reference made in the Pact for the Future to the said Convention does not affect or prejudice the positions of the Islamic Republic of Iran and its legal

status as a non-party to the abovementioned Convention. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea should not be considered as an exclusive framework for governing all activities related to oceans and seas. Reference to the Convention should be made in conjunction with other relevant legal instruments and frameworks.

21. The Islamic Republic of Iran reiterates that measures in the implementation of the Pact for the Future should be in full compliance with the fundamental principles of sovereign equality, non-intervention, and respect for territorial integrity of states. Nothing in the said document should be interpreted as to allow for derogations from or encroachment upon the obligation to comply with and respect these principles.